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Feminist Theory · Research

In search of feminist theory

Sylvia Walby replies to Felski, Phoenix and Knapp by asking what stories can persuade people to do, what a theory explains and how claims about inequality can be tested across contexts.

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Abstract

This short response considers how feminist theory can explain commonalities and differences within a shared framework and test knowledge claims against evidence and other theories.

Keywordsfeminist theoryuniversalismpatriarchyglobalizationtheorization
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Research notes

Read the reply in the order of the journal exchange

Sylvia Walby’s three-page “In search of feminist theory” appears on pages 236–238 of the second issue of Feminist Theory. The exchange began with her own longer article in that issue. Its abstract places social location and the force of argument in debates over recognition, redistribution and transformation, naming development indicators and suffrage among its examples. The reply asks a narrower question. Stories can persuade and differently situated groups can act together. An explanation of gender inequality also has to say how a pattern comes about and what could count as evidence for the explanation. Full journal text in the university repository · Guide to the opening article

Follow Walby’s reply to Rita Felski on page 236. She grants that storytelling can travel across cultural differences and that feminist politics has benefited from its persuasive force. She asks whether persuasion is evidence for an explanation, a question her concession helps clarify. In answering Ann Phoenix, she credits work already pursuing arguments she had presented as underdeveloped. The dispute with Axeli Knapp on page 237 is about what counts as theory. In Walby’s reading, making feminist theory a branch of critical theory gives too little place to empirical work. She and Knapp nevertheless agree that the production of theory can be shaped by social bias. The original order of the issue helps the reader keep Walby’s characterization of her interlocutors distinct from what they claim for themselves. Contents of the issue

What can be compared, and how would we know?

On page 238, Walby answers a question from Phoenix by describing scientific method as putting a knowledge claim up against evidence and other theories. Claims are fallible. Better comparative evidence, she argues, would improve debates about which interventions change gender inequality. She contrasts the procedures that literary researchers use to gather and sift texts with those social scientists use to work with statistics. The issue is partly one of disciplinary translation. Readers need to know what was collected, how researchers selected it and why they think the materials can be compared.

Try the development-indicator example from the opening article as a reading exercise. Two places can show a similar rate of women’s participation in paid work. Before claiming that the same arrangements produced it, ask whether each source captures seasonal work, unpaid family work and people leaving employment to provide care. This is an application of Walby’s questions, not an example offered in the reply itself. A comparison can bring out differences that require revising a common explanation. That is one way to test the possibility she sketches on pages 237–238, where accounts of difference and commonality can put pressure on each other.

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