Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective

In 1988, Donna Haraway published an article in Feminist Studies that would radically transform our understanding of knowledge, objectivity, and science. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective” not only challenged the myth of scientific objectivity but provided a revolutionary new framework for feminist epistemology. This article, born in “the belly of the monster, in the United States in the late 1980s” within “scientific and technological, late-industrial, militarized, racist, and male-dominant societies,” produced theoretical impacts far exceeding its historical moment.

A Revolutionary Moment in Epistemology

Haraway wrote this article against the backdrop of a dilemma facing feminist science studies in the 1980s. On one hand, feminists needed to critique the androcentrism and false universality claims of traditional science; on the other, they couldn’t simply embrace relativism, as this would undermine the political force of feminist critique. If all knowledge is merely social construction, how can feminist analysis of patriarchal oppression claim to be more true than anti-feminist views?

This binary dilemma—either accept oppressive universalism of traditional objectivity or fall into politically powerless relativism—seemed to trap feminist epistemology in a dead end. Haraway’s genius lay in refusing this false choice, proposing a third way: situated knowledges.

Critique of the “God Trick”

One of Haraway’s most famous theoretical contributions is her sharp critique of the traditional ideal of objectivity, which she mockingly calls “the god trick of seeing everything from nowhere.” The power of this critique lies not only in its rhetorical vividness but in its theoretical precision.

Traditional epistemology assumes the existence of an observational position that can transcend all particular perspectives, from which universal, neutral knowledge about the world can be obtained. This ideal observer has no body, no location, no history—it is precisely this unmarked quality that enables claims to universality. But Haraway reveals that this seemingly neutral position is actually a disguise for privileged positions: white, male, bourgeois perspectives present themselves as universal by denying their own particularity.

The problem with the “god trick” is not just that it’s false—no one can truly occupy such a transcendent position—but that it’s oppressive. It allows particular groups to speak in the name of universality while denying the validity of other perspectives. It creates an epistemological hierarchy where certain forms of knowledge are deemed “objective” and “scientific” while others are dismissed as “subjective,” “biased,” or “particular.”

The Conceptual Framework of Situated Knowledges

Facing this critique, Haraway proposes “situated knowledges” as an alternative framework. Situated knowledges recognize that all knowledge comes from specific positions, shaped by the knower’s body, history, and social location. Our positionality inherently determines what we can know.

But this is not simple relativism. Haraway emphasizes that acknowledging the situatedness of knowledge doesn’t mean all perspectives are equally valid. Rather, certain positions—particularly marginalized and oppressed ones—may provide clearer insights into power relations. This resonates with Marxist theories of class consciousness and Black feminist standpoint theory, but Haraway’s contribution lies in systematizing this insight as an epistemological principle.

Situatedness is not a defect of knowledge but its condition. It’s precisely because we view from specific positions that we can see anything at all. Complete objectivity would not only be impossible but undesirable—it would blind us. Instead, what we need is acknowledgment of our perspective’s partiality and openness to dialogue with other partial perspectives.

Redefining Feminist Objectivity

Haraway’s revolutionary move is to redefine rather than abandon objectivity. She proposes the concept of “feminist objectivity,” which “is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object.”

This new concept of objectivity has several key features. First is partiality—only partial perspectives can promise objective vision because only partial perspectives can be located and held accountable. Second is embodiment—knowledge is always produced by embodied subjects; the body is not an obstacle to cognition but its condition. Third is responsibility—when we acknowledge our location, we can be responsible for our knowledge claims. Fourth is connection—situated knowledges seek dialogue and coalition with other partial perspectives.

Feminist objectivity doesn’t seek the view “from above, from nowhere, from simplicity” but the view “from a body—always a complex, contradictory, structuring, and structured body.” This view from the body is not a limitation but the condition that makes responsible knowledge possible.

The World as “Witty Agent”

Another innovation in Haraway’s theory is her reconceptualization of research objects. Traditional epistemology views the world as a passive object awaiting subject cognition and mastery. While social constructivism critiques this view, it often goes to the opposite extreme, viewing the world as a product of human imagination.

Haraway proposes a third understanding: the world is a “witty agent” with its own agency and historicity in knowledge production. This is not anthropomorphization but recognition that the non-human world—nature, technology, animals—is not a passive resource but an active participant. Knowledge production should be understood as conversation between material-semiotic actors (human and non-human) rather than epistemic reification, possession, and appropriation.

This view has profound implications for scientific practice. If research objects are active participants rather than passive materials, then scientific research becomes dialogue rather than conquest. This requires scientists to develop listening capabilities, be open to the unexpected, and acknowledge that their objects might “answer” questions they didn’t ask.

The Politics of Vision

Haraway pays particular attention to vision’s privileged status in Western epistemology. “Seeing” has long been considered the most objective sense, with scientific instruments primarily extensions of visual technology. But Haraway points out that vision is never innocent—it’s always technologically mediated, culturally encoded, shaped by power relations.

She critiques two views of vision: the conquering gaze (the male gaze that transforms everything into objects) and relativism’s infinite vision (claiming to see everywhere from everywhere equally). As an alternative, she proposes the possibility of “feminist visualization,” which acknowledges its technological mediation and political positioning.

This critique of vision doesn’t mean abandoning it but retraining it. Haraway calls for developing “critical practices of particular embodiment in a technologized, globalized, postmodern world.” This includes learning to critically use scientific instruments and understanding how they construct rather than simply reveal reality.

The Interweaving of Epistemology, Ontology, Ethics, and Politics

Haraway emphasizes that the concept of situated knowledges operates simultaneously on four planes: epistemology (how we know), ontology (what exists), ethics (how we should act), and politics (how power operates). These planes are not separate but interrelated.

On the epistemological plane, situated knowledges challenge subject-object dualism, proposing a relational view of knowledge. On the ontological plane, it redefines relationships between beings, understanding the world as networks of heterogeneous actors. On the ethical plane, it demands responsibility for our knowledge practices and acknowledgment of their consequences. On the political plane, it reveals power relations in knowledge production and seeks more democratic forms of cognition.

The importance of this multidimensional approach is that it avoids the tendency to separate epistemological questions from other philosophical and political issues. Questions of knowledge are never just questions of knowledge—they’re always simultaneously about being, ethics, and power.

Impact on Scientific Practice

While Haraway’s paper is primarily theoretical, it has profoundly influenced scientific practice. More scientists recognize the situatedness of their work and begin reflecting on how their positions affect their research.

In medical research, recognizing that most clinical trials historically excluded women and minorities has led to more inclusive research practices. In ecology, acknowledging limitations of Western scientific perspectives has led to collaboration with indigenous knowledge systems. In technology development, the concept of situated knowledges has promoted critical reflection on whose needs are prioritized and whose voices are heard.

Dialogue with Other Theoretical Traditions

Haraway’s concept of situated knowledges resonates with and dialogues with multiple theoretical traditions. It shares with Marxism a critique of false universality but rejects simple base/superstructure models. It shares with phenomenology an emphasis on embodiment but rejects the priority of subjectivity. It shares with poststructuralism a critique of essentialism but retains commitment to materiality and truth.

Particularly important is the relationship with standpoint theory. While both emphasize the importance of position for knowledge, Haraway’s approach emphasizes partiality and openness more. She doesn’t seek privileged epistemological standpoints but advocates for dialogue and coalition between partial perspectives.

Critiques and Developments

The concept of situated knowledges also faces criticism. Some worry that emphasizing partiality might lead to epistemological fragmentation, making common understanding impossible. Others question how to make truth claims while acknowledging all knowledge is situated. Still others point out that Haraway’s theory may rely too heavily on visual metaphors, neglecting other senses and ways of knowing.

In response, scholars have developed and refined the concept of situated knowledges. They’ve explored how to build bridges between different situations, how to pursue broader understanding while acknowledging partiality, and how to combine situated knowledges with other epistemological frameworks. These developments show the generativity of Haraway’s concept—it’s not closed dogma but an open research program.

Cross-Disciplinary Impact

The concept of situated knowledges has spread far beyond its field of origin. In geography, it has influenced understanding of space and place. In anthropology, it has changed ethnographic practice. In art, it has inspired new creative and curatorial practices. In education, it has promoted recognition of different forms of knowledge.

This cross-disciplinary dissemination is not simple application but creative transformation. Each field has reinterpreted situated knowledges according to its own needs and traditions, producing new insights and practices. This generativity is exactly what Haraway hoped for—not establishing new orthodoxy but stimulating new ways of thinking.

Relevance in the Digital Age

In an era of algorithmic decision-making, big data, and artificial intelligence, Haraway’s insights are more relevant than ever. Algorithms often embody contemporary versions of the “god trick”—claiming to extract objective truth from data while hiding their designers’ values and assumptions.

The concept of situated knowledges reminds us that all algorithms are situated—they reflect particular training data, particular design choices, particular social contexts. Acknowledging this situatedness doesn’t mean abandoning algorithms but making them more responsible, transparent, and democratic.

Ecological and Environmental Dimensions

Haraway’s understanding of the world as “witty agent” has special relevance for environmental thought. In times of climate change and ecological crisis, recognizing the agency of the non-human world becomes increasingly important.

Situated knowledges provides a framework for understanding human-environment relationships that is neither the modernist fantasy of conquering nature nor romantic nature worship. Instead, it proposes a relational model based on interdependence, responsiveness, and responsibility.

Pedagogical Implications

Situated knowledges has profound implications for educational practice. If all knowledge is situated, then education cannot just be information transmission but must be recognition of students’ own situations and openness to other situations.

This has led to more reflexive and dialogical pedagogies. Teachers are no longer authoritative transmitters of knowledge but facilitators of dialogue between different partial perspectives. Students are encouraged to recognize how their own positions shape their understanding while learning to appreciate other perspectives.

Conclusion: The Continuing Challenge

More than thirty years later, “Situated Knowledges” continues to challenge us to rethink the nature of knowledge, truth, and objectivity. Its importance lies not only in the answers it provides but in the questions and possibilities it opens.

Haraway’s work reminds us that pursuing knowledge is always an ethical and political act. When we acknowledge the situatedness and partiality of our perspectives, we’re not abandoning objectivity but making a more responsible, democratic, and open objectivity possible.

In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, dialogue between multiple partial perspectives is needed to understand the challenges we face. Situated knowledges is not an epistemological retreat into relativism but an advance toward richer, more responsible knowledge practices. As Haraway shows, only by acknowledging the limitations of our vision can we begin to see more clearly. Only by abandoning the illusion of the “god trick” can we become better, more responsible knowers.